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Because their departures are difﬁcultly observed, little is known about the perfor-
mance of immigrants who leave their adoptive homeland. This paper shows condi-
tions under which the (conditional) outmigration probability, work probability and
the expected earnings of outmigrants are nonparametrically identiﬁed using data on
immigrant sample attrition. We present an econometric model which extracts the in-
formation on outmigration behavior from sample attrition and estimate it using data
from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). Outmigrants are found to have sig-
niﬁcantly lower labor market earnings and work propensities than permanent mi-
grants.
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11 Introduction
The widespread and often sizeable ﬂows of immigrants leaving their adoptive home-
lands, which we will refer to as outmigration, have recently received a lot of attention.
The case of Germany is a particularly revealing example, with an estimated yearly out-
ﬂow of half a million immigrants over the last decade (OECD, 2001). Several theories
have been put forward to motivate outmigration movements. Theories based on earnings
differentials between the current and new destination (Harris and Todaro, 1970), higher
marginal utility of consumption in the home country (Djajic and Milbourne, 1988), high
returns to human capital investments in the host country (Dustmann, 1993), informa-
tion dissemination (Stark, 1995), credit market rationing in the native country (Mesnard,
2001), and several sociological factors such as family uniﬁcation, health satisfaction, feel-
ings of being integrated in society (Stark, 1998) , and the quality and productivity of an
immigrant’s social network (e.g. Carrington, Detragiache and Vishwanath (1996)).
These theories do not trivially predict a speciﬁc composition of departing immigrants.
It could be the case for example that economically successful immigrants with a rela-
tively higher marginal utility of consumption in their native country might opt to leave
despite relatively lower earnings in that country, while persistently unsuccessful immi-
grants might ﬁnd a worthwhile to keep on searching for better labor market prospects
and move to a new destination. The lack of a clear-cut theoretical prediction concerning
the economic performance of outmigrants complicates the design of immigration poli-
cies which are often tailored around the notion that labor market equilibriums may be
affected by outmigration ﬂows of non-randomly selected workers. Careful forecasting of
the quality of the migration ﬂows is thus necessary if immigration policies are to meet the
future needs of the labor market. Additionally, recent theoretical and empirical evidence
hassuggestedthatmeasuresof economicprogressofimmigrantsin theirhostcountrycan
be adversely affected by selective outmigration (Schultz, 1998, and Edin, LaLonde, and
Aslund, 2000). Policies aimed at improving the labor market integration of its immigrant
population may thus also be misguided if it relies on these potentially biased measures
of immigrant assimilation.
In this paper, we are interested in estimating an economic model of outmigration
which nests several competing explanations of outmigration decisions. We do so by es-
timating a limited-dependent variable panel data model where labor market earnings,
work decisions, and outmigration decisions are jointly determined and depend on earn-
ings differentials, family uniﬁcation, credit market rationing, health satisfaction, and feel-
ings of being integrated in the host society. Unobservable characteristics such as an im-
migrant’s ability or the quality and productivity of his social network are incorporated
2in the model as individual speciﬁc unobserved heterogeneity components. The general
error structure of the model allows to test whether outmigrants are self-selected in terms
of labor market earnings and in terms of work status. The model also allows to assess the
impact of outmigration selection on estimates of measures of economic assimilation rates.
Compared to existing empirical models of outmigration (see below), our model has the
advantage of both incorporating the decision to work in a natural way and characterizing
the relationship between work status and outmigration.
Estimation of our model requires panel data on immigrants followed over a relatively
long period of time. As Dustmann (2002) recently pointed out, interesting empirical anal-
ysis of outmigration decisions is limited by the fact that data sets rarely contain informa-
tion on outmigration decisions1. Rather, they typically contain information on whether
immigrants fail to be successfully reinterviewed in subsequent waves, which may or may
not be due to selective outmigration. Existing empirical evidence on the economic per-
formance of outmigrants is pretty much tied to the strategy used to identify the economic
parameters characterizing the performance of outmigrants without observing outmigra-
tion decisions. Jasso and Rosenzweig (1990) identify the direction of outmigration earn-
ings selectivity by comparing the skill composition of speciﬁc cohorts over time. Hu
(2000) and Lubotsky (2000) estimate the parameters of the earnings function of immi-
grants who remain in the country, controlling for non-random outmigration selectivity by
matching cross-section data sets and longitudinal social security earnings records. These
approaches are not without their own limitations-they do not identify the level of earn-
ings of outmigrants, census and earnings records often have little information on both
the human capital level and sociological characteristics of migrants which are required
to test outmigration theories 2, they do not easily allow migration duration decisions to
depend on unobserved characteristics such as inherent ability or the quality of an immi-
grant’s social network which, at least on theoretical grounds, are important determinants
of migration durations.
In this paper, we present conditions under which the outmigration probability, the
work probability, and the expected labor market earnings of outmigrants are, condition-
ally on observable characteristics, nonparametrically identiﬁed from survey data with
sampleattrition. Thecornerstoneofouridentiﬁcationapproachconsistsofusingpanelat-
trition as a proxy variable for outmigration, and subsequently separating attrition which
is not due to outmigration movements from real outmigration decisions. Our approach
overcomes several of the shortcomings of earlier approaches used to identify the eco-
nomic performance of outmigrants. First, our approach is to our knowledge the ﬁrst one
which has the potential to provide nonparametric identiﬁcation of the economic perfor-
3mance and movements of outmigrants. Second, because the approach proposed uses sur-
vey panel data instead of census data, unobserved heterogeneity can easily be introduced
in the model. Third, the approach is general enough to be applied to any country with
an ongoing panel of immigrants (examples of countries with such panels are Canada,
Mexico, Germany, and the United-States.) and can be easily extended to estimate many
different types of economic models of outmigration. An example of this ﬂexibility is our
ability to analyze the interaction between earnings, work, and outmigration decisions in
a uniﬁed framework which was not previously possible without observing actual migra-
tion decisions. Finally, the estimator proposed is simple to apply, and is similar in spirit to
estimators proposed to deal with misclassiﬁcation of a discrete dependent variable (e.g.
Hausmann, Abrevaya, and Scott-Morton, 1998).
We estimate our model using the public use ﬁle of the GSOEP. We use data on native
Germans as a reference group to compute earnings assimilation rates for our immigrant
sample. We show how the availability of a sample drawn from the native population
has the additional advantage of providing a natural way to test some of the identifying
assumptions of the model. We estimate the annual outmigration rate in our sample to
be roughly 3% per year over our time horizon. Our simulation results indicate that av-
erage log earnings of outmigrants remained roughly 18% lower than those of immigrant
stayers, a clear indication that outmigrants are drawn from the bottom of the income dis-
tribution. Moreover, outmigrants are shown to have work probability 25% to 45% lower
than that of immigrant stayers over the period considered. Finally, we do not ﬁnd that
assimilation rates are particularly sensitive to outmigration, which contrasts with existing
results found in the literature.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our approach to iden-
tify the economic parameters of interest. Section 3 presents the econometric model used
to model outmigration in conjunction with the work decision and labor market earnings.
Section 4 presents the data used in the paper. Section 5 discusses the empirical results
of the model and tests for the presence of outmigration bias. It further presents some
simulation results used to evaluate the ﬁt of the model and to quantify the economic per-
formance of outmigrants. Section 6 concludes.
2 Identiﬁcation of outmigration parameters
Each immigrant of a population living in the host country is characterized in a given time
period by the vector (w, p,ru,x,z,s) where w denotes his potential labor market earn-
ings conditional on characteristics x, p is a binary variable taking a value of 1 when the
4immigrant works and whose outcome is conditioned on a vector of observable charac-
teristics z, ru is a binary indicator taking a value of 1 when the immigrant outmigrates
in the next time period and we condition this outcome on a vector of characteristics s.
We deﬁne X as the vector of all distinct elements of (x,z,s). We are interested in making
inferences on Pr(p = 1jru = 1,X), conditional work probability of an outmigrant, and on
Efwjp = 1,ru = 1,Xg, the conditional expected earnings of outmigrants. The inferential
problem consist of identifying these quantities when, instead of observing outmigration,
we observe a proxy variable ro, panel attrition, which takes a value of 1 when the im-
migrant leaves the panel in the following period. Outmigration and attrition are related
because an immigrant who leaves the country must also leave the panel with probability
1.3
We illustrate the identiﬁcation problems for the case where we want to make infer-
ences on Efwjp = 1,ru = 1,Xg. However, all results extend directly to identiﬁcation of
Pr(p = 1jru = 1,X).4 Theconditionalexpectedlabormarketearningsofimmigrantswho
leave the panel in the next time period can be expressed, using iterated expectations, as
Efwjp = 1,ro = 1,Xg = Efwjp = 1,ro = 1,ru = 1,Xg ¢ Pr(ru = 1jro = 1,X)
+Efwjp = 1,ro = 1,ru = 0,Xg ¢ Pr(ru = 0jro = 1,X)
= Efwjp = 1,ru = 1,Xg ¢ Pr(ru = 1jro = 1,X)
+Efwjp = 1,ru = 0,Xg ¢ Pr(ru = 0jro = 1,X) (1)
where the second equality follows from the fact that once we know if an immigrant left
or not the country, observing whether he left of not the panel does not contain any addi-
tional information on the earnings of this immigrant conditional on X.5 An immediate
consequence of equation (1) is that using panel attrition as a proxy variable for outmi-
gration in itself will give biased and inconsistent estimates of the conditional earnings
of outmigrants. This is so because the conditional expected earnings of immigrants who
leave the panel will in general be a weighted average of the conditional expected earn-
ings of outmigrants mixed with the conditional earnings of immigrants who remain in
the host country. The mixing probabilities control the size of the bias. The key parameter
is Pr(ru = 0jro = 1,X), which represents the probability that an immigrant stays in the
the host country given that he is observed to leave the panel. The higher this probabil-
ity, the higher will be the bias. If every immigrant who leaves the panel also leaves the
country, ro would perfectly measure outmigration, Pr(ru = 0jro = 1,X) would be equal
to zero, and the bias would be zero.
Next, we follow the same steps to derive the conditional expected earnings of immi-
5grants who remain in the panel
Efwjp = 1,ro = 0,Xg = Efwjp = 1,ru = 1,Xg ¢ Pr(ru = 1jro = 0,X) (2)
+Efwjp = 1,ru = 0,Xg ¢ Pr(ru = 0jro = 0,X)
Because an immigrant cannot be observed to have left the country given he is observed
to be in the panel, Pr(ru = 1jro = 0,X) = 0, Pr(ru = 0jro = 0,X) = 1 and (2) simpliﬁes
to
Efwjp = 1,ro = 0,Xg = Efwjp = 1,ru = 0,Xg (3)
which indicates that the conditional earnings of immigrants who remain in the panel co-
incides with the expected earnings of immigrants who remain in the host country, and
it follows that Efwjp = 1,ru = 0,Xg is nonparametrically identiﬁed from data on immi-
grants in the sample. Substituting (3) in (1) we obtain
Efwjp = 1,ro = 1,Xg = Efwjp = 1,ru = 1,Xg ¢ Pr(ru = 1jro = 1,X)
+Efwjp = 1,ro = 0,Xg ¢ Pr(ru = 0jro = 1,X)
whichcan be solvedin terms of Efwjp = 1,ru = 1,Xg, theparameter we hopeto identify,
Efwjp = 1,ru = 1,Xg = Efwjp = 1,ro = 1,Xg ¢W1 (X)
¡1
¡Efwjp = 1,ro = 0,Xg ¢W0 (X)W1 (X)
¡1 (4)
Equation (4) shows that the conditional expected earnings of outmigrants can be ex-
pressed as a weighted average of two conditional expectations which are identiﬁed from
the data. If the weights can be identiﬁed, then the conditional earnings of outmigrants
will be identiﬁed. Applying Baye’s rule, the weights are given by
W0 (X) = Pr(ru = 0jro = 1,X)
= Pr(ro = 1jru = 0,X)
Pr(ru = 0jX)
Pr(ro = 1jX)
W1 (X) = Pr(ru = 1jro = 1,X)








Pr(ro = 1jX) isidentiﬁedfromtheattritiondata. WhatremainstobeidentiﬁedisPr(rujX)
and Pr(ro = 1jru = 0,X). It is clear assumptions must be placed on the data generat-
ing process to identify the relationship between the observable attrition indicator ro and
the unobservable outmigration indicator ru. To simplify the notation, we will denote
6a10 (X) ´ Pr(ro = 1jru = 0,X). Using the law of total probability, the attrition probabil-
ity can be expressed in general terms as
Pr(ro = 1jX) = a10 (X) + [1¡ a10 (X)] ¢ Pr(ru = 1jX) (5)
and the probability of remaining in the sample as
Pr(ro = 0jX) = 1¡ fa10 (X) + [1¡ a10 (X)] ¢ Pr(ru = 1jX)g (6)
Several assumptions can be imposed on the data generating process in order to identify
both a10 (X) and Pr(ru = 1jX).
Assumption A1 a10 (X) = a10 ¸ 0
Proposition 1 If A1 holds and there exists a X such that Pr(ru = 1jX) = 0,
Efwjp = 1,ru = 1,Xg is nonparametrically identiﬁed.
Proof. Given the foregoing discussion, it sufﬁces to establish that the conditions
of the Proposition identify the weights W0 (X) and W1 (X). From (5), it follows that
Pr(ro = 1jX) = a10 whichidentiﬁes a10 fromlimitobservationssatisfyingPr(ru = 1jX) =
0. Given a10 is identiﬁed, Pr(ru = 1jX) is identiﬁed from (6), which implies that the
weights W0 (X) and W0 (X) are both nonparametrically identiﬁed.
Proposition 1 shows that if attrition which is not due to outmigration is random in
the population (A1), all important economic parameters characterizing outmigration be-
havior can be recovered from the data if there exists a sample of permanent migrants;
i.e. immigrants whose outmigration probability is close to zero. In practice, this does
not seem to be a strong requirement, especially for western countries where permanent
migration is known to occur at a very large scale (OECD, 2001). Note that in practice,
A1 needs not to hold if attrition which is not related to outmigration does not vary in the
population (i.e. if the variance V (a10 (X)) ¼ 0). This can be veriﬁed for example by com-
puting marginal effects from binary choice regressions on attrition outcomes for a sample
of individuals who by construction do not outmigrate, and test if these effects are small.
Natives living in the host country is one example of a sample not prone to outmigration.
If attrition which is not due to outmigration is believed to be related to observable fac-
tors which induce sufﬁcient variation in the attrition process across individuals, nonpara-
metric identiﬁcation of the economic parameters of outmigrants requires some exclusion
restriction.




7Proposition 2 If A2 holds and there exists a X¤
2 given X1 such that Pr(ru = 1jX1,X¤
2) = 0,
Efwjp = 1,ru = 1,Xg is nonparametrically identiﬁed
Proof. Foragiven X = (X0
1,X0
2)
0, a10 (X) = a10 (X1) fromA2. UsingPr(ru = 1jX1,X¤
2) =
0, the subsample of immigrants (X0
1,X¤0
2 )
0 identiﬁes a10 (X1) from (5). Given a10 (X1) is
identiﬁed, Pr(ru = 1jX) is identiﬁed from (6), which implies that the weights W0 (X) and
W0 (X) are both nonparametrically identiﬁed.
Partly because attrition and outmigration are very different processes, ﬁnding realistic
exclusion restrictions which satisfy the requirements of Proposition 2 is not very restric-
tive. Usually outmigration is modelled as a life-cycle event, inﬂuenced by poor labor
market performance, integration feelings, credit rationing in the home country and age
at immigration. Whether attrition which is not due to outmigration is related to all these
factors seems a priori unlikely, given that part of the survey non-response is generally
based on respondents refusal to continue working with the survey agencies.
3 Parametric model and estimation method
In this section, we develop and estimate a parametric model which allows us to extract
outmigration behavior from panel attrition. The choice of a parametric model is moti-
vated by our desire to model selection into work and outmigration as a decision based on
individual speciﬁc unobserved heterogeneity. We are not aware of any existing semipara-
metric technique which would allow us to estimate the system of equations presented
below.
We have a measure of N immigrants in period 1, where immigrant i remains in the
panel for Ti periods. For each immigrant i, we observe in period t, whether he works
pit, his monthly labor market earnings e(wit), and his attrition status ro
it in the next period.






where b are unknown parameters, h1
i is an unobserved time invariant individual speciﬁc
component of income while #1
it represents a stochastic shock. These labor market earnings
are only observable when an immigrant works. The work decision pit is assumed to be






8where q are unknown parameters, h2
i is an unobserved component of work and #2
it rep-
resents some stochastic shock to the work propensity. Participation is determined by the





. When pit = 1, earnings wit are observed. Both h1
i
and h2
i can be thought of capturing immigrants unobserved ability to generate higher
earnings and to ﬁnd jobs. They can also be thought of as including unobserved family
background characteristics and preferences for work and leisure. Finally, an immigrant’s
unobservable outmigration propensity r¤







where g are unknown parameters, h3
i captures the individual speciﬁc attachment to his
native country and #3







is assumed to be ob-
served by the immigrant who takes it into account when making his decisions but it is






be the decision rule governing
the true outmigration decision in period t + 1. Outmigration ru
it is unobservable. In our
empirical application, we assume that A1 holds6 and express the attrition probability as
Pr(ro
it = 1jsit) = a10 + [1¡ a10] ¢ Pr(ru
it = 1jsit) (10)
Equation (10) is the sample counter part of equation (5).7
The earnings, work and outmigration outcomes are not likely to be independent of
each other. This will not be independent if, for example, immigrants who ﬁnd work
very easily and/or who earn a high income are more reluctant to outmigrate. The un-
observed heterogeneity components h1
i ,h2
i and h3
i can be treated either as ﬁxed constants
or as random variables. The main advantage of the ﬁxed effect approach is that it does








. However, estimation of ﬁxed effects in nonlin-
ear models remains today a sizeable complication, with very little guidance in the choice
of models (see the recent review of Arellano and Honore, 2001). A second drawback
of ﬁxed effect estimation is that by treating the unobserved heterogeneity components
as ﬁxed, cross equation correlations which drive selection into work and outmigration
based on unobservable individual characteristics are not identiﬁed. As the present paper
is mainly concerned with selection issues, ﬁxed effect estimation would limit our insights
in the type of selections present in the data. We therefore introduce these dependencies
by assuming that the stochastic time-invariant effects are independent and identically























hj denotes the variances of the unobserved heterogeneity components, and r
h
i,j de-
notes their correlations.8 These correlations are indicative of whether or not immigrants
self-select themselves into work and into outmigration based on their unobservable indi-
vidual characteristics. A signiﬁcant and positive r
h
1,2 indicates that individuals who are
more likely to work are also more likely to have higher earnings, give observed char-
acteristics. r
h
1,3 has a similar interpretation and is indicative of outmigration bias. This
coefﬁcient will be negative (positive) if immigrants who have a higher probability of out-
migrating have below (above) average monthly earnings. Finally, r
h
2,3 can be interpreted
as measuring outmigration bias in the work decision and whose sign has a similar inter-
pretation.






¤0 is i.i.d normally distributed with mean


















w is the variance of log earnings, while the variances of the unobserved stochas-
tic shocks entering the work and outmigration equations are set to 1 for identiﬁcation
purposes. Contemporaneous correlations between the three stochastic components are




To simplify the presentation of the likelihood function, we divide the observable char-





t=1 of dependent variables, a
set Xi = fxit,zit,sitg
Ti















trivariate normal density, conditional on the random effects. Numerical approximation
of the likelihood function proceeds in two steps. In the ﬁrst step, the likelihood func-
tion is computed conditional on the unobserved individual characteristics. This ﬁrst step
10density is given by



































The case where outmigration is perfectly observed follows by setting a10 equal to 0. The
setsWit andPit deﬁnethedomainofintegrationoverthewageandworkspacesandvary
over time as individuals make different choices in each period according to the following
table
Integration domains in period t
Qit Cit
Work ¡ [0,¥)
Not Work (¡¥,¥) (¡¥,0]
Income is integrated out in waves where individuals do not work. The integration do-
main for the work propensity follows from the work decision rule. In the second step, the
unconditional likelihood function is obtained by integrating out the random individual
effects over R3
f (yijXi; b,q,g,S,W,a10) =
Z
R3 f C (yijXi,hi; b,q,g,S,a10)h(hi;W)dhi
where H denotes the trivariate normal cumulative distribution function with mean vector
0 and covariance matrix W.
To solve the numerical integration problem, we approximate the integral by a simu-













from the multivariate normal distribution H at a given value of W.9 For each draw, the
conditional likelihood function f C is evaluated. The partial MSL estimator consists of















The resulting estimator is inconsistent for ﬁxed R but will be consistent if R tends to
inﬁnity with the number of observations N. If
p
N/R ! 0 and with independent draw-
ings across individuals, the method is asymptotically equivalent to maximum likelihood
(Train, 2003). Finally, we model labor market earnings and work decisions of Germans
using similar speciﬁcations of equations (7) and (8) and estimate the parameters using the
simulation techniques described above.
114 Data
The data used in this paper is taken from the public use ﬁle of the GSOEP and covers the
1985-1999 period. Until 1990, the GSOEP consisted of two samples, A and B. Sample A
consistsofhouseholdswithGermanheadslivinginformerWest-Germany. SampleBcon-
sists of an sample of immigrants living in West-Germany coming from countries which
had signed a bilateral migration agreement with Germany in the 1950s and 1960s namely
Greece, Italy, Spain, Turkey and Yugoslavia.10 Data on speaking ﬂuency, integration feel-
ings of immigrants, intended length of stay and remittances directed to their family living
outside Germany were given in consecutive waves from 1984 until 1987. Starting in 1987,
this information was gathered every other year. In order to keep constant the time period
between observations, we have chosen to keep the 8 waves of the panel where detailed
information on immigrants was available, each spanned by one year, starting in 1985 and
ending in 1999. Following the literature measuring the economic assimilation rate (e.g.
Borjas, 1999a), we restrict our attention to males between 18 and 64 years of age during
the 1985-1999 period. Excluded from the sample are individuals who died during the
observation period and individuals who gave incomplete information on any single vari-
able entering the empirical model in any of the 8 waves. This leaves us with a sample of
1987 native Germans and 732 immigrants starting in 1985.
The identiﬁcation approach presented in section 2 relies on the information contained
in panel attrition. It becomes instructive to contrast the attrition pattern of our immigrant
sample with that of Germans whose attrition cannot obviously be attributed to outmigra-
tion. Table 1 contains information on the number of individuals observed along with the
percentage of the original 1985 sample who remains in a given wave.11 41.9% of Germans
and 26.7% of immigrants have been interviewed successfully in all the waves. The attri-
tion rate in a given wave is deﬁned as the percentage of individuals not observed in the
given wave but observed in the preceding wave. Over our sample period, an average of
11.6% of the remaining Germans and 17.2% of immigrants drop out of the panel every
two years. In the case of Germans, outmigration is de facto not an issue. Assuming that
the difference in attrition rates is due to outmigration, a back of the envelope calculation
implies that we would expect the outmigration rate in our sample of immigrants to be 6%
every two years, or 3% per year, a number which would be in line with those reported
in the literature (see Borjas and Bratsberg, 1996). Of course, this calculation relies on the
assumption that attrition in the immigrant population which is not due to outmigration is
of comparable magnitude to that of natives. We will come back to this in section 5 which
reports indirect evidence suggesting that this should indeed hold in Germany.
The top panel of Figure 1 shows the average monthly gross income for working immi-
12grants and Germans over the period covered. In 1985, the mean income of Germans was
3,357 DM per month compared to 2,690 DM per month for immigrants, giving an income
ratio of 1.25 favoring Germans. The mean wage differential remaind relatively steady
until 1991, after which, the mean income differential widened even more between the
two groups to reach a ratio of 1.34 in 1999, with Germans receiving an average monthly
wage of 5,848 DM while immigrants were receiving 4,348 DM per month. The diverging
economic progress of Germans and immigrants after 1991 is also reﬂected in the work
frequencies. The bottom panel of ﬁgure 1 shows the sample frequencies of individuals
working in the month preceding the interview. We can see that until 1991, labor force
participation was very similar for both Germans and immigrants. After 1991, we observe
a steady decline in the work frequencies for both groups. During that period, the percent-
age of immigrants working remained steadily below that of Germans. The severe drop
in work frequencies for both groups coincides with the general deterioration of the labor
market in the regions of former West-Germany. Table 3 gives the unemployment rate per
year by state. With the exception of Berlin, all provinces experienced their lowest unem-
ployment rate of the 1985-1999 period in 1991. After 1991, the unemployment rate has
progressively risen apart from a slight fall in 1999 for most provinces.
If outmigration does occur at a systematic time in the life-cycle, it is likely to affect
the age and years since immigration composition of our sample of immigrants. Table 2
gives variable descriptions and summary statistics for Germans and immigrants for the
1985 and 1999 waves. We see that both Germans and immigrants are, on average, a little
less than 40 years of age in 1985 while the average age of the cohort increases to 45 years
of age in 1999 for both groups. As the average age of the sample increased only 8 years
over this 14 year period, it is clear that both the relatively older Germans and immigrants
left the panel. For a given mean age, Germans have acquired relatively more years of
education, but relatively lower labor market experience than immigrants. The average
number of months of labor market experience of immigrants increased by a little less
than 32 months compared to 70 months for Germans, which is consistent with the fact
that the proportion of working immigrants relative to Germans fell dramatically in the
1990’s.
Most immigrants migrated to Germany early in their productive lives, a fact reﬂected
byanaverageageatimmigrationofnearly24years, aﬁgureconsistentthroughouttheob-
servation period which indicates that most migrants were old enough to autonomously
decide to move to Germany. Both the evolution of years since immigration and immi-
gration year are consistent with the hypothesis that outmigration occurs 20 years after
migration (OECD, 2001). The average year of immigration of our cohort is 1969 in the
131985 wave, but raises to 1979 in the 1999 wave, indicating that the earlier cohorts are most
susceptible to have dropped out of the panel. As the earlier cohorts contain the migrants
with the higher number of years since migration in 1985, it is not surprising to see that av-
erage years since immigration increases relatively less than the 14 year time span, passing
from 15.75 in 1985 to 19.63 in 1999, indicating again that earlier cohorts are those who left
the panel. Reported feelings on integration in the German society and reported speak-
ing ﬂuency improved over time while health satisfaction seems to deteriorate, the latter
likely capturing an aging effect. Finally, 73% of immigrants reported having a spouse
living outside Germany in 1985 while as little as 1% still do so in 1999. This result can be
interpreted in two ways. First, spouses may have eventually migrated to Germany dur-
ing the time period. Second, it might be that immigrants whose spouse was living abroad
were more likely to outmigrate.
5 Results and simulations
The regressors included in the earnings and work equations are education, labor mar-
ket experience, labor market experience squared, self reported German speaking ﬂuency,
and the number of years since immigration to Germany. These are the standard variables
that have appeared in this literature (Borjas, 1999a). The provincial unemployment rate
in each wave is added in both equations to capture local labor market conditions. Fi-
nally, we include time ﬁxed effects in each wave to capture remaining macroeconomic
cyclical ﬂuctuations. We use reported health satisfaction as the exclusion restriction in
the work equation. Reported health satisfaction is a valid exclusion restriction if health
problems occur mostly at a time in which an individual is more likely to have found a
stable job whose continuation depends on the worker’s choices. The outmigration equa-
tion includes as regressors whether or not the wife of immigrants lives in Germany, the
immigrants self reported feelings of belonging to the Germans society and the unemploy-
ment rate. Immigrant’s who arrive at a young age presumably have the highest incentive
to invest in acquiring country speciﬁc human capital. This effect is captured by including
age at arrival in Germany.
Immigrants investing in their native country presumably have different incentives to
stay in the host country. The motives of these investments will affect their duration of
stay. Immigrants may extend their stay in the host country in order to further increase
their investments in their native country. On the other hand, if immigrants invest in
starting up a business they wish to manage-as proposed by Dustmann and Kirchkamp
(2002), high levels of investments will be associated with shorter migration durations.
14To disentangle both hypothesis, we include in the outmigration equation the cumulative
amount of money returned to the native country since 1984 as a proxy for investments.
Reportedhealthsatisfactionandself-reportedexpectedlengthofstayinGermanyarealso
included, the later captures anticipatory behavior of migrants, which have been shown to
affect the acquisition of country speciﬁc skills (e.g. Dustmann, 2002b). Time dummies are
added to capture remaining macroeconomic ﬂuctuations.
In order to separate the impact of selection on earnings into a work and outmigration
effect, we ﬁrst estimated an earnings equation with random effects. Our second speciﬁ-
cation is a bivariate model of labor market earnings and work. We ﬁnally estimated the
complete model or earnings, work and outmigration. In the latter case, we experimented
with an alternative speciﬁcation of the outmigration equation which contained education,
labor market experience and its square, speaking ﬂuency, and years since immigration as
regressors. A log-likelihood ratio test of the null hypothesis that these human capital vari-
ables have no joint effect on outmigration could not be rejected at conventional levels.12
5.1 Equation results
5.1.1 Covariance structure
We begin our analysis of the results with a discussion of the estimates characterizing the
covariancestructureoftheunobservedcomponentswhichareinformativeoftheselection
mechanisms. Table 4 presents estimates of the covariance structure. Focusing on the most
general model which controls for both work and outmigration selection, we ﬁnd a small







, indicating that individuals with higher probabilities of work-
ing are also more likely to have higher earnings. The correlation between individual time













is -49.8%, both signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Both correla-
tions suggest that individuals with a higher propensity to outmigrate are those with both
a lower probability of ﬁnding work, and a lower labor market earnings, which points to
negative outmigration selection. When comparing results with the bivariate model which
does not correct for outmigration, we ﬁnd that the estimated value of r
h
1,2 remains stable.
Results for Germans are similar to that of the immigrant sample, with a small but positive






. Finally, transitory shocks between earnings
and work, and shocks between work and outmigration, are all signiﬁcantly negatively
correlated, the former at -34.2% and the latter at 30.4% while we do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant
correlation between the transitory shocks of the earnings and outmigration processes.
155.1.2 Outmigration
Table 5 presents the parameter estimates of the outmigration equation. We ﬁnd that im-
migrants whose wife lives with them in Germany have a signiﬁcantly lower probability
of outmigrating, reﬂecting a preference for family unity. Immigrants satisﬁed with their
health are signiﬁcantly less likely to outmigrate, a ﬁnding consistent with the sociological
ﬁndings reported in Stark (1998). Intended length of stay captures the expectations of im-
migrants and offers direct information on their remigration intentions. Not surprisingly,
we ﬁnd that migrants who expect to remain longer in Germany are also less likely to
outmigrate. Deteriorations of the local labor market conditions, reﬂected in higher unem-
ployment rates, have a positive and signiﬁcant effect on the likelihood of outmigrating.
The effect of cumulative savings returned to the home country is not signiﬁcant, implying
thatimmigrantswhohavesavedand returnedmoremoneytotheir nativecountryarenot
more likely to outmigrate. Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2002) ﬁnd that Turkish return mi-
grants have accumulated enough wealth in Germany to start up businesses in their home
country upon their return. Because Turks are the biggest ethnic group in our sample, we
would expect that increasing remittances increase the probability of outmigration if the
money returned is intended to be eventually invested in a business. Our results suggest
that migrants returned money to help relatives rather than for investment purposes. Fi-
nally, immigrant’s feelings of integration in the German society are not correlated with
outmigration.
In our data, the average attrition rate par wave (every two years) is 11.6% in the sam-
ple of Germans and 17.2% in the immigrant sample. If the proportion of immigrants
dropping out of the panel and remaining in Germany is of the same magnitude to that of
Germans, than the difference of 3% in annual attrition rates between natives and immi-
grants would be an estimate of the outmigration rate. We do not have direct information
indicating that immigrants in Germany have the level of attrition which is not due to
outmigration than natives. However, apart from outmigration and deaths, panel attrition
occurs either because individuals decide to stop participating in the survey project, or in-
dividuals move within Germany and cannot be tracked by the survey institution. If Ger-
mans and immigrants have similar response rates or similar mobility, we would expect
both groups to be equally well traceable. Clark and Drever (2001) have shown that immi-
grants in the GSOEP sample are not more likely to move within Germany than natives.
Furthermore, Pischke and Velling (1997) have shown that immigrants in the western parts
of Germany live in regions with a high concentration of ethnic minorities. Both results
imply that, if anything, immigrants are easier to track than natives. Hence the proportion
of immigrants dropping out and staying in Germany should be of similar magnitude to
16that of Germans. This suggests that a10 should be no greater than 11.6%, which is what
we ﬁnd in the data.
We showed in section 2 that the conditional work probability and earnings of outmi-
grants are nonparametrically identiﬁed under the assumption that there exists a sample
of immigrants with a probability of outmigrating close to 0. Estimates of our paramet-
ric model were used to compute the predicted probability that an immigrant leaves the
host country in the following year. The 25th percentile of the outmigration probability
distribution was 0.69% in 1985 and 0.81% in 1997, indicating that there is a considerable
amount of immigrants with an outmigration probability close to 0.
5.1.3 Earnings equation
Table 6 presents parameter estimates of the earnings and work equations for the immi-
grant and German samples for all three models considered. We will ﬁrst focus on the
more general model which controls for both work and outmigration selectivity and sub-
sequently compare the results with the more parsimonious models. Part of the earning
disparity between Germans and immigrants can be explained by different returns to hu-
man capital investments. Returns to education of immigrants are roughly one third those
of Germans, where an extra year of schooling raises earnings of Germans by 9.2% and
those of immigrants by 2.9%. Part of the earnings differential between Germans and
immigrants can also be related to returns to labor market experience. An extra year of
labor market experience raises earnings of Germans by 0.6% compared to 0.32% for im-
migrants. The quadratic term of labor market experience indicates that the differential
in earnings attributed to different returns to labor market experience diminishes as the
level of experience increases. As expected, immigrants with better speaking ﬂuency have
higher earnings.13 Finally, higher unemployment rates are associated with lower earn-
ings in the immigrant population (at the 10% signiﬁcance level) but do not affect labor
market earnings of the native population. Given we include controls for time periods,
identiﬁcation of this effect relies on regional variations across provinces in Germany. The
effect of unemployment on earnings thus reﬂects that at any point in time, earnings differ
across provinces depending on the tightness of the local labor market.
When controlling for outmigration selectivity, we control for the fact that the sample
of immigrants observed over time has above average conditional earnings relative to the
population expectation. We then expect that the returns to some human capital factors
will be lower in the overall immigrant population than in the population of permanent
migrants. Changes in the returns to education when controlling or not for outmigration
goes along those lines. We ﬁnd that the returns to education of immigrants passes from
172.9% when outmigration is accounted for to 3.5% when we do not control for outmigra-
tion. This change is consistent with the hypothesis that permanent migrants have above
average labor market earnings. The coefﬁcient of years since migration progressively de-
creases as less selection is accounted for, passing from 0.079 to 0.073 when controlling for
work selectivity to 0.069 without any selection controls, although these changes are not
signiﬁcant. Finally, the coefﬁcient of the linear term of labor market experience increases
while the coefﬁcient of the quadratic term decreases when outmigration is not accounted
for. Again, both these changes are not signiﬁcant at conventional levels.
The robustness of parameter estimates to controls for work and outmigration selectiv-
ity has implications for estimates of the economic assimilation rate. The latter is generally
deﬁned as the differential in earnings between immigrants and natives with similar char-
















For Germans, the passage of time is modelled as an increase of one year of labor market
experience while for immigrants, the passage of time is modelled by increasing both the
number of years of labor market experience and the number of years since immigration
by one year. We computed the assimilation rate at the sample average of the labor mar-
ket experience of immigrants in 1985. The estimate of the assimilation rate is found to be
-5.00% per year when outmigration is not accounted for, and raises to -4.78% when outmi-
gration is accounted for, a statistically insigniﬁcant increase. These results show that the
conditional convergence of labor market earnings of immigrants to that of natives is not
taking place in Germany. It is important to stress that the robustness of assimilation rates
to outmigration selectivity is not inconsistent with our ﬁnding that outmigrants are nega-
tively selected. The effect of outmigration on the estimated values of the assimilation rate
will depend on both the earnings and work probability gap between outmigrants and
immigrant stayers and on the size of the outmigration population. In the next section,
we will present simulations which indicate that the earnings and work probability gaps
between outmigrants and immigrants who stay are of sizeable magnitude, but the size
of the outmigration population is small. Hence, assimilation rates should be relatively
robust to outmigration selection.
5.1.4 Work equation
The results for the work equation are in line with those of the earnings equation, both in
terms of the sign of the effects and on the robustness of the parameters to outmigration
selection. For both immigrants and Germans, all parameters are statistically signiﬁcant.
18Education and labor market experience have positive effects on the probability of work-
ing. Higher unemployment rates have a negative effect on the work probability while im-
migrants and natives with better reported health satisfaction have a higher probability of
working. Speaking ﬂuency has a positive effect on work participation while the number
of years since immigration has a negative and signiﬁcant impact on work participation.
Similar to earnings, we ﬁnd that parameter estimates of the immigrant work propensity
are quite robust to return migration selectivity. The only noticeable difference concerns
the negative effect of the state level unemployment rate, whose coefﬁcient passes from
-0.054 to -0.076 when controlling for outmigration.
5.2 Simulations
Simulations are used for two purposes. First, they allow to check whether our model
provides a good ﬁt to the data. Secondly, they allow us to quantify the implications of
outmigration selectivity on log monthly earnings and work propensities of immigrants.
Our simulations were done in the following way. For each individual appearing in the








. Then, in each time period, we draw for each immigrant appearing







. The draws from the time invariant stochastic components are then matched
to the draws of the transitory stochastic components and used to predict whether the
immigrant will work and whether he will outmigrate in the next period. We compute
the predicted log earnings for each immigrant predicted to work in a given wave. Sim-
ulations are then averaged over all draws and individuals. Simulations for the German
sample follow a similar path. Simulation results are presented in Table 7. The ﬁt for the
German sample is very good, with both real and simulated paths closely following each
other over the entire sample period. Simulated log earnings paths of immigrants are good
up till 1991, after which, the model tends to over predict the monthly log earnings. Part of
these discrepancies can be attributed to the progressively small immigrant sample sizes in
the latter years, a fact reﬂected in the increasing dispersion of the simulated log earnings
estimates over time (not shown here).
The empirical results of the previous section indicated that outmigrants were selected
from the bottom of the earnings and work propensity distributions of the immigrant pop-
ulation. To gain some insights into the economic performance gap between immigrants
who remained in Germany and those who left, we took the simulations which were used
to compute results for immigrants in Table 7 and separated them into a group of predicted
outmigrants and a group of predicted stayers. The top panel of Figure 8 reports simula-
19tions of log earnings while the bottom panel reports the simulated work propensities.
In 1985, the log earnings of outmigrants where 17.2% lower than those of the immigrant
stayers. Thisgapwidenedto20.1%in1991beforedroppingbacktoagapof17.7%in1997.
The gap in work propensities between immigrant stayers and outmigrants also conﬁrms
the strong negative outmigration selectivity. Outmigrants are predicted to have a work
propensity 25% lower than that of immigrant stayers in 1985. In 1995, at the end of the
economic downturn, this gap climbed to nearly 44%. Overall, these simulations clearly
indicate that the economic performance of outmigrants in the wave preceding their de-
parture was dramatically worse than that of stayers, both in terms of earnings and work
probabilities.
6 Conclusions
This paper has presented a general framework to analyze the determinants of outmi-
gration, to test the robustness of measures of economic assimilation, and to measure the
parameters characterizing the economic performance of outmigrants using panel data
subject to sample attrition. We estimated a three equation panel data model where out-
migration decisions, work decisions, and expected labor market were jointly determined
and allowed to depend on a rich set of observable characteristics, and on individual spe-
ciﬁc unobserved heterogeneity.
The model was estimated using the German and Immigrant samples of the Public
use ﬁle of the GSOEP. The econometric results are broadly consistent with a pattern of
negative outmigration selection. The model predicts an annual outmigration probability
of 3% in our sample population. Simulations revealed that compared to immigrants who
remaininGermany, outmigrantshavebetween17%and20%lowerexpectedlabormarket
earnings, and between 25% and 44% lower probabilities of working over the 1985-1999
period. Interestingly, we do not ﬁnd evidence that outmigration ﬂows biases estimated
assimilation rates.
Computation of the results above did not require that outmigration decisions were
observable. The strategy used to identify the relevant parameters characterizing the eco-
nomic performance of outmigrants relied on using sample attrition as a proxy variable
for outmigration, and subsequently separating true outmigration movements from non-
response which is unrelated to departures. Conditions for nonparametric identiﬁcation of
the work and outmigration probabilities, and the expected earnings of outmigrants have
been presented. These conditions require that an economic model be speciﬁed in which
some immigrants have an outmigration probability approaching zero. Importantly, as-
20suming the econometric model is well speciﬁed, the validity of these conditions can be
tested after estimation.
The economic model estimated in this paper is obviously just one example. Numerous
directions of extension exist. The framework can be extended to any country where out-
migration ﬂows pose substantive concerns to policy makers, given survey data on these
immigrants is available. The approach can also be extended in order to estimate economic
structural static and dynamic models, allowing to recover preference parameters and to
perform interesting policy simulations. Finally, the framework can be used more gener-
ally to study migration movements other than those of immigrants. The empirical results














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Wife in Germany -0.692
(0.174)






Age at immigration /102 1.618
(0.755)




Table 5: Estimation results for outmigration. Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses.
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2: Top panel: simulated log earnings for immigrants over the 1985-
1997 period. All, Stayers and Outmigrants refer to simulations averaged
respectively over all immigrants, predicted stayers only and predicted out-
migrants only. Simulations in each period are obtained by taking for each







over all draws the predicted earnings of those predicted to work. Bottom
panel: Simulated proportion of immigrants working in the 1985-1997 pe-
riod. Simulations are performed as in the top panel.
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